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THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Michael J. Struett*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has become popular in recent years to suggest that state
sovereignty, as a phenomenon in the international legal system,
is in decline.1 One such challenge to state sovereignty is the
empowerment of international organizations or institutions to
make binding decisions in areas that historically have been the
prerogative of sovereign states.
A prime example of this
phenomenon is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
states party to the ICC statute, also known as the Rome Statute,
grant the court considerable authority over the prosecution of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, when those
crimes are committed by the member state’s citizens or on its
territory.2 It has been alleged by the United States that, in
addition to the voluntary sacrifice of sovereign authority by
states party to the ICC, the new ICC also infringes on the
sovereign rights of non-state parties.3 This would occur if the
establishment of the International Criminal Court modifies the
sovereign rights of both state parties and non-state parties.
State sovereignty, however, remains a foundational norm of
*Ph.D. candidate, International Relations, University of California Irvine; M.A. George
Washington University, 1998; B.A. University of California Berkeley, 1995. Email:
mstruett@uci.edu. The author thanks Wayne Sandholtz and Steven Weldon for helpful
comments on this work, and the editorial staff of the Chapman Law Review, especially
Anthony Geraci for improving the article.
1 JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY 40 (Princeton University Press 1990). See generally Oscar Schachter, The
Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 7 (1997).
2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 529, 533-34 (1999).
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the international legal system. This article will examine the
challenges to state sovereignty that are brought about under the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but will argue
that these are developments of the concept of state sovereignty
and not a radical departure from it.
Viewed from this
perspective, arguments by the United States government that
the Rome Statute violates the sovereign rights of non-state
parties4 have little merit, as the principles of the ICC statute are
well in line with the traditional state sovereignty norms that are
the foundation of international law. The essential impact on
non-state parties’ sovereignty is that nationals of such states who
commit crimes on the territory of states party to the ICC statute
could potentially be punished for their crimes before the new
international court. However, under the traditional rules of
international law, nationals of a foreign state are normally
subject to the laws of the state where they are traveling.5
Consequently, to the extent that the establishment of the
International Criminal Court creates obligations for non-state
parties, it does so in a way that is perfectly consistent with the
foundational international law norm of state sovereignty. States
that consent to become parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court do engage in a significant
redefinition of their sovereign rights and responsibilities, but
they do so in a way that is consistent with the gradual evolution
of the concept of state sovereignty over the centuries. Therefore,
the establishment of the International Criminal Court does not
radically undermine the concept of state sovereignty; instead, it
modifies sovereignty norms in a direction that promises to permit
the continued utility of the concept for international law in the
twenty-first century.
II. THE CONCEPT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
A.

Sovereignty as a Social Construct

State sovereignty is a foundational legal concept of
international law which holds that states should have autonomy
to act, and be free from, unwanted intrusions by other states.6
However, the precise rule content of the sovereignty concept has
changed a great deal over time. For instance, it was once
4 Pierre-Richard Prosper, Foreign Press Center Briefing (May 6, 2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/9965.htm.
5 Covey T. Oliver, The Jurisdiction (Competence) of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 307, 309 (M. Bedjaoui ed. 1991).
6 State sovereignty is defined as “[t]he right of a state to self-government; the
supreme authority exercised by each state.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (8th ed.
2004).
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accepted that one of the privileges of sovereign states was the
right to use force in world politics. Today, in contrast, the
concept of state sovereignty includes the right to be free from
armed attack on a state’s sovereign territory.7 I accept the notion
articulated by Werner and others that sovereignty is a
conceptual category of international law whose specific content
changes over time through the discursive practices of states.8 As
Werner puts clearly:
State sovereignty is not a descriptive concept which stands for
(‘mirrors’) a pre-given state of affairs and which can be measured and
counted in an objective way. The very fact that collapsed states still
count as sovereign states in international law suggests otherwise.
Rather than being a representation of a state of affairs, state
sovereignty is a claim to authority; a claim which has been
institutionalized, defined and redefined within the framework of
international law.9

This perspective is at odds with the view that sovereignty is
an actual political characteristic of independent political entities
that have de facto political autonomy.
In such a view,
international law simply takes note of that empirical situation.10
I assume, instead, that the discourse of international law has
substantiated the conceptual category of sovereignty.
The
existence of a body of law based on the principle of the
independence of sovereign states has legitimized and
institutionalized the existence of political forms that claim the
status of sovereign states. Moreover, the particular bundle of
rights and duties that sovereign states claim to possess as a
result of qualifying for legal sovereign status has changed
considerably over time.
Biersteker and Weber elaborate on the view that sovereignty
is a socially constructed legal concept whose exact content
changes considerably over time. They assert that:
Sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims for state
actions, and its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the
use of force in international relations. Sovereignty, therefore, is an
inherently social concept. States’ claims to sovereignty construct a
social environment in which they can interact as an international
society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of

7 Wouter Werner, State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse, in
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 127 (Wouter G. Werner & Ige F.
Dekker eds., 2004).
8 Id. at 131-33.
9 Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
10 For an articulation of the view that sovereignty is an empirical phenomenon that
is merely recognized by international law, see generally ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN
STATEHOOD, THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Allen & Unwin 1986).
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claims to sovereignty is an important element in the construction of
states themselves.11

Thus, sovereignty is a social fact. States exist as meaningful
entities because they are constituted by international law rules of
recognition.
At the same time, states constitute those
institutional rules of international law by interacting in ways
that develop and modify the meaning of sovereignty over time.
The relationship between states, as agents, and international
law, as an institution, is mutually constitutive.12 While the
specific rules of conduct for sovereign states shift over time, the
sovereignty idea always refers to some capacity of the state to act
independently from other sources of authority.13
One consequence of the view that sovereignty is a socially
constructed phenomenon is that it is no longer necessary to view
the international norm of state sovereignty and the norm of
individual human rights as existing in opposition to one
another.14
Instead, constructivist scholars of international
relations have argued that, since 1945, with the era of decolonization and self-determination, the obligation of sovereign
states to protect the individual human rights of their citizens has
become essential to legitimizing the existence of the international
state system itself.15 The reason for the legitimacy of the state
system in earlier centuries was the divine right of kings, but,
since the middle of the twentieth century, the foundational
reason for the existence of modern states is to protect the most
basic human rights of their populations. As Reus-Smit puts it:
“Far from being a categorical right with no strings attached,
therefore, the post-1945 right to self-determination was
deliberately and explicitly tied to the satisfaction of basic human
rights.”16

11 Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State
Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 1, 1-2 (Thomas J. Biersteker &
Cynthia Weber eds. 1996) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
12 On the sociology of agents and structures, see generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (University of
California Press 1984). With respect to states and international society, see ALEXANDER
WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 67 (1999).
13 Biersteker & Weber, supra note 11, at 14.
14 For the opposite view that the ICC is a challenge to states’ sovereign rights, rather
than a transformation of them, see Rod Jensen, Globalization and the International
Criminal Court: Accountability and a New Conception of State, in GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 170-71 (Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. Dekker eds., 2004).
15 Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,
27 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 519, 519-20, 531-36 (2001).
16 Id. at 536.
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Sovereignty and the Juridical Equality of States

Of course, a crucial aspect of the legal concept of state
sovereignty is the juridical equality of the states in the
international system. However, Michael Byers notes the fiction
of legal equality masks significant differences in a state’s actual
power, and those power differences suggest that states have
differing abilities to influence the content of international law.17
Byers argues that powerful states tend to be more engaged in the
international system, and, therefore, their acts have a
disproportionate impact on the evolution of customary
international law. Additionally, they tend to maintain larger
diplomatic corps that give them added influence in bilateral and
multilateral treaty drafting. As I have argued elsewhere, one of
the consequences of the establishment of the International
Criminal Court is that it gives judges of that court substantial
authority to direct the evolution of the practical application of the
laws of war.18 I elaborate on this power of the ICC below. This
power to define the law comes partly at the expense of powerful
states that have historically determined the application of the
rules of international humanitarian law through their own
practices of discourse and prosecution.
Critical legal theorists have noted that international law,
like virtually all legal orders, is not inherently fair in its
application precisely because power plays a role in the
development and application of the law.19 One important change
in the legal rights of sovereign states that ratify the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court is that they grant
significant authority to the Court’s prosecutor and judges to
determine whether or not particular actions carried out by
individuals constitute violations of international humanitarian
law. As a consequence, the establishment of the Court shifts real
legal control from the great powers towards this newly
constituted international judiciary.
Since military powers
historically defined the application of international criminal law
standards to their own soldiers, personnel, and citizens, they
exercised enormous discretion over the practical definition of the
crimes mentioned under the Geneva Protocols of 1949 or the

17 MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-40 (Cambridge University Press
1999).
18 Michael Struett, NGOs, the International Criminal Court, and the Politics of
Writing International Law, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 327-28
(Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. Dekker eds., 2004).
19 See generally DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
(Basic Books 3d ed. 1998) (1982).
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Genocide Convention.20 If the judges of the ICC are fair and
professional in their application of the standards, this
development could weaken the argument that international law
ultimately is a legal system that serves the interest of only the
most powerful states that participate in the international legal
system.
C.

Sovereignty and Individuals as Subjects of International
Law

Historically, individuals were not recognized as subjects of
international law, and it was assumed that only states, not
individuals, had rights and obligations under international
criminal law.21 Chinese writers on international law have
recently reiterated this view, claiming that international law
gives no status to individuals on Chinese territory to claim rights
against the state.22 However, this argument has been widely
criticized as being the obvious manipulation of international law
by totalitarian states to preserve its own absolute power.23
Moreover, in the twentieth century, the view that individuals
have both rights and obligations under international law has
gained widespread acceptance.24 Indeed, since international law,
like any legal system, is ultimately a standard for human
behavior, it would seem to be a logical necessity that it would
regulate individual human conduct, even if the formal
constitution of international law is premised on specific acts
undertaken by states as corporate entities.25
International Criminal Law as a field rests upon the reality
that states have deliberately created rights and duties for
individuals under international treaties and customs.26 The
International Criminal Court is a direct challenge to traditional
conceptions of state sovereignty because it creates a
supranational judicial authority with the power to rule whether
20 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res
260 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 174, U.N. Doc A/810, (Dec. 9, 1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
entered into force January 12, 1951.
21 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of International Law, in 2 THE WORKS 537 (J.
Bowring ed. 1843).
22 See generally Hungdah Chiu, Guojifa Xin Lingyu Jianlun (A Concise Introduction
to the New Areas of International Law), 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 892 (1988) (book review).
23 See
generally LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (1989).
24 See generally RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE (Westview Press 1985).
25 Id. at 205.
26 See
generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 1999); JORDAN J.
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Carolina Academic Press
2d ed. 2000).
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or not particular uses of force by state officials are criminal and
sanctionable violations of international law.27 This means that
the court, and not states alone, will have the authority to help
determine what constitutes a legal use of force. Of course, the
notion that states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
within their territory is central to the legal concept of
sovereignty. That circumstance is not undermined by the
establishment of the International Criminal Court, because the
court does not constitute any new authority with police power.
However, states that ratify the statute give the court a role in
determining which particular uses of force are legitimate.28
Consequently, the legal privileges of sovereignty are altered by
the court’s establishment. In effect, states that are parties to the
ICC statute limit their own autonomy in determining whether or
not the conduct of their public officials comports with obligations
that states have adopted to limit their use of force.
D. Popular Sovereignty and the Legal Concept of State
Sovereignty
State sovereignty is increasingly conceptualized as a
phenomenon that creates both rights and responsibilities for
In effect, there is an emerging norm in
governments.29
international law that States owe certain obligations to their own
citizens, and to the international community.30 The political
liberty that comes with state sovereignty has to be tempered by a
responsibility to exercise that liberty in a way that is not severely
detrimental to people living inside or outside of the sovereign
state’s jurisdiction. For example, the emerging preference in the
international legal system for democratic forms of government
suggests that sovereign states have a legal obligation to consider
the needs of the citizens of their state.31
In all the states where the United Nations has recently been
involved in “state-building” exercises after a period of war or
other upheaval, democracy has repeatedly been the form of
government preferred by international organizations and their
members.32 This pattern of state practice suggests an emerging
Rome Statute, supra note 2.
Id.
See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.
ca/pdf/commission-report.pdf.
30 See generally id.
31 See generally id.
32 See generally Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of
States and Governments, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 123
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
27
28
29
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standard that participatory forms of political organization are to
be preferred over forms of government where a political elite is
not accountable to the general populace.33 This suggests that the
legal concept of sovereignty in international law now focuses
increasingly on the popular sovereignty of the citizenry rather
than on the political sovereignty of the government. The now
extensive pattern of international treaties that recognize
participatory political rights means there has been a shift in the
locus of sovereignty.34 As Greg Fox writes, this “shift in the locus
of sovereignty undermines arguments against participatory
rights based on an infringement of sovereignty. For a nondemocratic regime to claim that participatory rights violate its
national sovereignty begs the question of whether that regime
has legitimate authority to make such a statement.”35
Another example of the increasing significance of the norm of
state responsibility over taking the rights aspect of state
sovereignty can be seen in the emergence of “The Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement” adopted by the UN
Commission on Human Rights.36 In this case, we are not dealing
with legally binding law. Still the development of workable
norms in this area, their adoption by a major UN body, and their
use in the field by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and
other actors, all serve to reinforce the notion that sovereign
states have responsibilities and not just rights. The question of
internally displaced persons is a classic example of a lacuna
created in international law by the doctrine of absolute state
sovereignty.37 Of course, persons displaced across international
boundaries now benefit from a number of international law
rights and privileges. Conversely, persons displaced from their
homes by armed conflict who remain within the boundaries of a
sovereign state have more limited international legal rights
because such persons are traditionally at the complete mercy of
their sovereign state governments.38
The development of the Guiding Principles for Internally
Displaced Persons is a study in the growing recognition that
states have obligations to their own citizens. Roberta Cohen
33 Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 48, 71-86 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R.
Roth eds., 2000).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 89.
36 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Commission Human Rights,
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998).
37 See generally Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement:
An Innovation in International Standard Setting, in 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459 (2004).
38 Id.
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writes: “[w]hile acknowledging that primary responsibility rests
with national authorities, the Guiding Principles recast
sovereignty as a form of national responsibility toward one’s
vulnerable populations with a role provided for the international
community when governments did not have the capacity or
willingness to protect their uprooted populations.”39 We are
witnessing the gradual strengthening of the notion of popular
sovereignty in the international political normative order, at the
expense of strict privileges of state sovereignty.
State
sovereignty is increasingly only viewed as legitimate to the
extent that it gives expression to the popular sovereignty rights
of the people.
The International Criminal Court creates new norms that
are of precisely this type. The primary effect of the ICC on
member states’ sovereign rights is to create an important
institutional incentive for member states to prosecute genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity when they occur on the
states territory. Since the ICC only has jurisdiction if states fail
to prosecute themselves,40 the existence of the court puts
pressure on states to exercise their own criminal jurisdiction over
these crimes. In the absence of the ICC, other things being
equal, states would have more latitude to decide for themselves
whether or not it was politically desirable to prosecute these
types of cases. Of course, states had already accepted the legal
obligation to punish or extradite for genocide, if they ratified the
1948 Genocide Convention, and grave breaches of the war crimes
law, if they ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949.41
What is new about the ICC is that it threatens to proceed
with international enforcement of these crimes if states fail to
punish. In effect, the ICC promises to uphold a certain minimal
standard of compliance with the requirement on states to punish
violations of international criminal law. This can be viewed as
recognizing the rights of the citizens of states to be free from
victimization as a result of crimes recognized under international
criminal law. As such, it is a modification of the meaning of state
sovereignty. Of course, in some cases, states will be glad to shift
Id. at 459.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
Regarding the duty to prosecute war crimes, see STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 82 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2001). Regarding
the duty to prosecute Genocide, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 20, arts. 6-7; but be aware of numerous reservations to
these provisions. See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
39-40 (2001).
39
40
41
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the burden of prosecution to the ICC rather than undertake such
prosecutions themselves. This possibility is discussed more
below. But for the majority of states, the incentive will clearly be
to handle such matters within their own legal systems.
III. BASIC POWERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
By creating an individual standard of accountability for
violations of the laws of war, the International Criminal Court
potentially places meaningful restrictions on the way states can
employ organized violence.42 The four classes of crimes over
which the ICC will have jurisdiction all involve international
norms that restrict the way in which states can exercise the use
of force.43 It does this by forcing state officials to consider the
possible legal repercussions should the force be deemed
inappropriate by outside legal authorities. Historically, this fact
was seen as the major political stumbling block to the
establishment of a permanent ICC.44
The establishment of the International Criminal Court also
places restrictions on a state’s ability to determine for itself
whether or not particular acts qualify as war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or genocide. The absence of a clearly specified
international criminal code has also been seen as a major
stumbling block to prosecuting international crimes in a court of
law.45 Of course, there is no recognized legislative body in the
international system.
Both customary and treaty based
international law criminalize specific acts, but whether or not
those crimes were sufficiently specified so as to make them
enforceable in a court of law was debated before the
establishment of the ICC.46 States have traditionally exercised a
great deal of control over the content of international law,
42 Michael Struett, The Meaning of the International Criminal Court, 16 PEACE
REVIEW 317, 319 (2004).
43 The four crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5. Significantly, the court will not exercise
its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until the states who are parties to the Rome
Statute agree on a definition of that crime. Id. Of course, non-state actors can also
commit these crimes.
44 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARD
WORLD PEACE : A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, xii (Oceana Publications 1980).
See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: Where They Stand
and Where They’re Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 375, 375-81, 84. (1992); Michael P.
Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 103,
111-13 (1994). These works document the reluctance of states to define international law
crimes with sufficient precision for an international criminal court to convict violators.
45 Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, supra note 44.
46 See generally Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent
Proposals and American Concerns, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 121 (1994); FERENCZ, supra note
44.
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including the ability to determine in large part through custom
what is considered a war crime and what is not.
The traditional sources of international law are primarily
controlled by state governments. Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice formally recognizes four sources of
international law: treaties, custom, general principles of law, and
the commentary of judicial decisions or leading publicists on
international law.47 Sovereign states have control over the first
two sources, since states conclude treaties and custom refers
explicitly to the practice of states. As a result, states have
traditionally exercised a great deal of control over the content of
international law, including the ability to determine in large part
through custom what is considered a war crime and what is not.
Since the general principles of law are essentially constant over
time, and the role of commentary is a subsidiary one that is
parasitic on the actual behavior of states, states historically have
exercised a virtual monopoly on the actual legislation of
international law.
Within the last century, the doctrine that only sovereign
states can be the authors of international law has come under
challenge.48 To the extent that the resolutions of international
organizations and decisions of international administrative
bodies can have binding effects in law, at times by means of
parliamentary style voting, as in the Security Council, or the
General Assembly, or other international bodies, this introduces
an element in the source of law that is not directly controlled by
states.49 Even so, states do exercise some influence here, because
the state governments choose the representatives of such
international organizations.50 Judicial bodies can also play a role
by offering authoritative interpretations on ill defined areas of
the law. While the ICJ is limited in this respect by Article 59,
which proscribes the precedential value for the World Court’s
decisions,51 other international and domestic courts, including
Nuremberg, the ICTY and the ICTR are not so limited. The ICC,
as a permanent judicial body, has the potential to exercise
considerable influence over the content of international criminal
law, and the ICC’s decisions will have precedential value, at least
for future cases heard under the statute itself.52
47 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 8
U.N.T.S. 993.
48 FALK, supra note 24.
49 U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
50 The European Parliament is an important exception.
51 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 47, art. 59.
52 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144, 157-158
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The International Criminal Court was established by a
multilateral treaty negotiated by the representatives of sovereign
states.53 As such, it is not an organ of the United Nations, nor is
it functionally a part of any other international organization, but
the statute does give particular privileges to various United
Nations organs. The treaty, normally referred to as the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court, like any treaty, is
only binding on those states that have formally ratified it. The
Rome Statute establishes the court and gives it jurisdiction over
persons “for the most serious crimes of international concern” as
provided for in Article 1 of the treaty.54 It also gives the court
“international legal personality.”55
The Rome Statute gives the court jurisdiction over the
crimes of Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,
and it specifically defines those crimes in Articles 5-8.56 The
Rome Statute also gives the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of
Aggression but only if and when the states agree to a definition
of that crime via an amendment to Article 5 of the ICC statute.57
Such an amendment would need to be ratified or accepted by
seven-eighths of the states that are ICC members before it would
come into effect, and cannot be formally considered until July
2009.58 This procedure could also be used to add additional
crimes to the jurisdiction of the court in the future. There are
some very specific restrictions on when the ICC can exercise its
jurisdiction, which will be discussed after the main structures of
the court have been outlined.
Part IV of the Rome Statute, Articles 34-52, provide for the
election of eighteen judges, a prosecutor and deputy prosecutor
by the Assembly of States Party to the ICC.59 The registrar of
the court is elected by the judges.60 The Assembly of States
Parties is composed of a representative from each state that
ratifies the Rome Statute. The Assemblies organization and
administrative powers over the other organs of the court are
described in Part 11 of the statute, Articles 112-118.61
The jurisdiction of the court is complementary to the
(1999) (stating that Article 10 of the Rome Statute, which stipulates that the Rome
Statute is not intended to modify any existing provisions of international law for purposes
other than those of the statute, does not block the ICC from following its own precedents).
53 Rome Statute, supra note 2.
54 Id. art. 1.
55 Id. art. 4.
56 Id. arts. 5-8.
57 Id. art. 5.
58 Id. arts. 121, 123.
59 Id. arts. 34-52.
60 Id. art. 43.
61 Id. arts.112-118.
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jurisdiction of national courts, which also presumably have the
authority to prosecute the international law crimes covered by
the Rome Statute.62 This concept of concurrent jurisdiction was
labeled “complementarity” during the ICC negotiations.63
Complementarity means simply that the court’s jurisdiction
overlaps without allowing the supranational court to act as an
appellate court for domestic criminal trials. In general, a case is
inadmissible before the ICC if it is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction “unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution . . . .”64 In other words, the ICC is intended to defer
to trials by states in their domestic legal systems.
The
jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to handling cases where
national courts fail to prosecute. The ICC statute adopts the
traditional legal norm against double jeopardy, so the ICC will
not hear cases where a domestic court has already rendered a not
guilty verdict, unless it can be shown that the domestic trial was
a show-trial intended to shield the accused.65 The statute does
give the ICC judges the authority to determine whether or not a
state is genuinely willing and able to prosecute, and therefore,
whether or not the ICC prosecutor can investigate any particular
case.66
This feature does represent a significant change in the
sovereign rights of states. For the first time, it allows for a
supranational review of national judicial systems decisions. This
feature was viewed as essential by advocates of a strong court,
because otherwise, governments could always shield their
citizens from prosecution by the ICC by holding a show trial.67
Rod Jensen has commented that this feature of the court’s
jurisdiction compels states that want to avoid the ICC prosecutor
from intervening in events that take place on their territory to
adopt criminal legislation to enable the prosecution of those
crimes under their domestic law.68 If ICC member states fail to
adopt such legislation they invite a determination by the ICC
prosecutor that the state is unable to prosecute.
While the ICC does have the authority to determine whether
or not decisions taken in national courts were genuine
Id. art. 1, pmbl.
Id.
Id. art. 17.
Id. arts. 17, 20.
Id. at arts. 18, 19.
For an early example of an non-governmental organizations policy paper arguing
this point, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESTABLISHING A JUST, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 14 (1994).
68 Jensen, supra note 14, at 181.
62
63
64
65
66
67
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prosecutions, this is not nearly so broadly defined as a general
appellate review power. This relationship between national
courts and the ICC was critical to the willingness of States to
establish a permanent international criminal court, and the exact
specification of this relationship was a central issue in the
negotiations.69
The court can exercise its jurisdiction over the core crimes
whenever they take place on the territory of a state that has
ratified the statute, or when the perpetrator is the national of a
state party.70 Additionally, the ICC’s statute allows the Security
Council of the United Nations to refer cases when they take place
anywhere in the world,71 using its powers to regulate
international peace and security under Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter.72 Significantly, the Rome Statute does not
grant the ICC universal jurisdiction over Genocide, or any of the
other crimes, even though the 1947 Genocide Convention does
give municipal courts the authority to prosecute that crime
regardless of where in the world it occurs.73 The ICC can only
exercise its jurisdiction if a state party or the Security Council
refers a situation where crimes have allegedly occurred to the
prosecutor, or if the prosecutor has information indicating that
crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed
and he receives authorization from the pre-trial chamber of
judges to open an investigation.74 Finally, the ICC only has
jurisdiction over crimes that were committed after the Rome
Statute entered into force on July 1st, 2002.75
IV. SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC FOR STATE PARTIES
The International Criminal Court is dependent on sovereign
states in order for it to function effectively. However, it also
creates incentives that are likely to modify state behavior in
significant ways. Over time, that modified behavior will likely
change peoples’ expectations around the world about the
enforcement of criminal sanctions for gross human rights abuses.
These changes will be brought about through the exercise of
individual states’ sovereign rights and privileges, not by
undermining them.
69 See, e.g., Press Release, USG for Legal Affairs and U.N. Legal Counsel, May 18,
1998, available at http://www.un.org/icc/usgpress.htm.
70 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12.
71 Id. art. 13 (b).
72 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
73 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 20.
74 Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13-15.
75 Id. art. 11.
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The ICC creates incentives in two different ways. First, as
its founders intended, it creates an incentive for states to be more
consistent in punishing violations of international criminal law
that occur on their territory.
However, the first few
investigations that the ICC has undertaken in Uganda and the
Congo, and the recent request for Court action in Burundi,
suggest another dynamic that is likely to develop between states
and the ICC.76 Second, for weak states that have difficulty
maintaining law and order in their own territory, the ICC creates
a tremendous incentive and a standing mechanism to request
international assistance in carrying out investigations and trials
of gross human rights abusers. This is a type of burden shifting
that transfers responsibility from the individual state to the
International Criminal Court.
Of course, given its own resource constraints, the ICC will be
tremendously limited in the number of cases it can take on this
basis. To combat this problem, the ICC is permitted to take
funding donations from private sources.77 One hopes that a
sufficient number of governments, foundations, and/or private
individuals will be willing to donate funds to ensure that the
most egregious cases of violations of international criminal law
will be adequately investigated and prosecuted. However, it is
far from certain that the potential donor pool is equal to the task
of providing enough funds to deal with what may be an
unfortunately large number of war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
For state parties, the most intrusive changes in sovereignty
norms will appear when the ICC prosecutes a case with respect
to events that took place on that state’s territory or involving its
citizens. The power of the ICC prosecutor to conduct on site
investigations under Part 9 of the ICC statute was an extremely
contentious issue during the ICC negotiations.78 The Rome
Statute envisions two different scenarios for the capacity of the
ICC prosecutor to conduct “on-site” investigations.79 In the ideal
situation, the state party on whose territory the investigation is
being conducted will be willing to cooperate with the
investigation. In that case, the Rome Statute provides for
elaborate set of notification requirements designed to facilitate
76 For more information on these ICC investigations, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.
html (discussing the investigation in Uganda and Congo); http://globalsolutions.org/
programs/law_justice/news/burundi.html (discussing Burundi).
77 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 116.
78 Fabricio Guariglia, International Law Criminal Procedures: Investigation and
Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS 227, 231 (Roy S. Lee ed. 1999).
79 Id.
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close cooperation between the prosecutor’s office and the relevant
state party.80
However, it was also felt that it would be important for the
prosecutor to have some power to conduct interviews even when
the state was either completely ineffective, and therefore unable
to facilitate the ICC prosecutor’s investigation, or in situations
where the state was unwilling to cooperate.81 In those cases, the
ICC statute gives the prosecutor’s office some authority, in
carefully limited circumstances, to conduct interviews of
witnesses on the state’s territory without the presence of state
officials, but only under the close supervision of the judges of the
ICC’s pre-trial chamber.82 This power of the ICC prosecutor can
only be exercised on the territory of state parties.
This later scenario is a substantial change from the normal
sovereign prerogatives of states. Still, it is an arrangement that
states only enter into by voluntarily ratifying the ICC statute. A
state’s willingness to do this can be understood when looked at in
conjunction with the emerging standard of popular sovereignty
discussed above.
By ratifying the ICC statute, sovereign
governments are attempting to ensure that if the rule of law
should break down in their societies, resulting in massive
violations of international criminal law, they, via the
international community, have the capacity to bring the
individual perpetrators to justice.
This international intervention could be interpreted as a step
toward restoring the legitimate sovereignty of the people, since in
a time of lawless conflict, the true sovereign authority of the
people would be incapable of expression. Because of this,
sovereign states feel a need to ratify the ICC statute, granting
investigative powers to the ICC prosecutor and judges in
advance.
V.

SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC
FOR NON-STATE PARTIES

The central legal implication for states that have not ratified
the Rome Statute is that their nationals could be tried by the
ICC if they commit crimes encompassed by the ICC within the
territory of a state that has ratified the Rome Statute.83
Additionally, non-state parties’ could be tried through the
Security Council mechanism, even with respect to events that
80
81
82
83

Id. at 231-32.
Id.
Id. at 232-33.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12.
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happen on the territory of a non-state party.84
These
developments, while significant, do not substantially change the
legal situation that United Nations member states faced prior to
the establishment of the ICC. As a matter of power politics, the
ICC may command more authority to bring suspects to justice
than would be the case with municipal legal systems of many less
powerful states. As a result, the ICC may make deliberate
political action by states to shield persons from accountability
more difficult. However, the view that the ICC statute creates
new legal obligations for non-state parties cannot be sustained.
To the extent that the Court may have an impact on the exercise
of non-state parties’ sovereign rights, it does so in a way that is
perfectly consistent with existing international law.
In the closing days of the Clinton Administration David
Scheffer lobbied for states supporting the ICC to agree to limit
the ability of the court to detain official personnel of non-state
parties. He said, “we believe there should be a means to preclude
the automatic surrender to the Court of official personnel of a
non-party State that acts responsibly in the international
community and is willing to exercise and capable of exercising
complementarity with respect to its own personnel.”85 Scheffer
referred to this as “a fundamental issue [that] needs to be
resolved [whose] . . . . outcome would open the door for the
United States to become the good neighbor to the Court.”86 Of
course, this issue was never resolved in a way that was
satisfactory to the United States government.
According to a crucial rule of international law, states cannot
be obligated to obey a treaty unless it agrees to so obligate
itself.87 Diane Amann has argued forcefully that the ICC creates
“non-consensual” legal jurisdiction in a way that violates the
principle that treaties are not binding on non-signatory states.88
The governments of the United States, China, and India have
also complained that the ICC Statute impinges unfairly on their
sovereign rights. As Amann rightly points out, it is essential to
the quasi- democratic legitimacy of international law that states
cannot be made to accept international legal obligations except
Id. art. 13.
David Scheffer, Statement Before the Sixth Committee of the 53rd General
Assembly (U.N.): The International Criminal Court (Oct. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.int/usa/98_179.htm.
86 Id.
87 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1968, arts. 34-38, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27 1980, available at www.un.org/law/ilc/texts
/treaties.htm.
88 Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State,
in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 187-98 (Wouter G. Werner & Ige F.
Dekker eds., 2004).
84
85
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through their own consent. Careful analysis shows however that
the Rome Statute is not guilty of creating new legal obligations
for non-state parties.
The legal impact of the ICC’s establishment on the citizens of
non-state parties is that there is one additional forum in which
they may be tried for war crimes, crime against humanity, and
genocide.89 Such persons could already have been tried in the
courts of a foreign state if they committed those crimes in that
state before the establishment of the ICC. In many cases, they
could have been subject to trial in a foreign state court even for
acts committed in their home state under universal jurisdiction
rules.90 As a legal matter, it seems there is little difference
between individuals being held responsible for violations of
municipal law in states they visit versus being held responsible
for violations of international law in states they visit. The
traditional rules of international law have long maintained that
states have the jurisdiction to prosecute foreigners for conduct on
their territory.91 As many advocates of the ICC have pointed out,
there is no logical reason why such states should be barred from
cooperating by a multilateral treaty to punish conduct which
each of them had a clear right to punish individually.
Amann argues that this transfer of jurisdiction from national
legal systems to a supranational court is illegitimate.92 The
central line of reasoning is that ICC jurisdiction is substantially
different from one state transferring its territorial judicial
authority to another state. Here the argument relies on the fact
that many states have been reluctant to grant such authority in
the context of European judicial cooperation.93 However, arguing
that states have been reluctant for political reasons to engage in
this practice is not the same thing as arguing that there is a well
recognized rule of international law that disallows the practice.
Amann goes on to argue that the ICC is different from states
exercising jurisdiction over crimes on their territory individually
because ICC decisions are much more likely to have precedentsetting effects.94 She cites as evidence of this, the decision by the

89 See, e.g., Jerry Fowler, Not Fade Away: The International Criminal Court and the
State of Sovereignty, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L J.L. 125 (2001) (book review); Cosmos Eubany,
Justice for Some? U.S. Efforts Under Article 98 to Escape the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103 (2003).
90 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 41.
91 Emer de Vattel, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1758).
92 Amann, supra note 88, at 194.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Doe I v. Unocal,95
wherein the judges relied in part on a legal standard developed
by the UN ad hoc criminal tribunals.96 However, it is simply
incorrect to consider this as an imposition on American
sovereignty.
The judges in the American court were not
compelled to follow the international precedent in this case.
Instead, they chose to do so. In so doing, they were exercising
U.S. sovereign rights, by voluntarily complying with emerging
international standards. This is a consensual acceptance of the
legitimacy of international norms, not an imposition by a
supranational court that is compelled against the will of a state
sovereign.
If the ICC develops into a globally respected judicial
institution, there is every reason to believe it will issue decisions
interpreting the laws of war in ways that diverse legal scholars
will find persuasive. The ICC may indeed have a definitive
impact on shaping the legal enforcement norms concerning these
international crimes. Politically, this undoubtedly weakens the
ability of the United States and other great powers to shape the
development of these international norms to their own liking.
This fact is at the core of some of the opposition to the court
within the US Government. Of course, the United States can
resist normative developments that occur at the ICC and limit
their tendency to be enshrined in Customary International Law
by consistently objecting to the ICC’s practice.
This is
undoubtedly part of the unstated logic behind the campaign of
the Bush Administration to belittle the ICC at every available
turn. But the precedent setting effects of the ICC could always
be resisted by US judges if they desire. The Rome Statute clearly
states that its contents cannot “be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this statute.”97 This
gives sufficient latitude to municipal judges to reach their own
interpretations of provisions of international humanitarian law
even if they are at odds with rulings by ICC judges.
All of this means that the complaints that the ICC creates
unfair legal effects on non-state parties, through precedent or
some other mechanism, are really not substantial.
A.

The ICC and the Relationship Between Law and War
Since 2001, the policy of the United States government has
95
96
97

395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 948.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 10.
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been to defend the idea that the United States is entitled to use
force preemptively as an extension of the traditional right to selfdefense enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.98 A number
of American legal scholars have perplexingly defended the
legality of this proposition.99 The American position does not
recognize a similar right on the part of other states to use force
against the United States if they feel similarly threatened. This
lack of reciprocity will ultimately undermine the credibility of
international law itself if the United States continues to pursue
this route.
Curtis Doebbler and Maha Eid argue persuasively that, at
best, the legal reasoning behind these arguments involves a
selective interpretation of existing law, while, at worst, an
attempt by respected scholars to ensure their own access to the
corridors of power by saying what powerful government officials
want to hear.100 This issue is relevant here because it is essential
to understand the legal debate about the impact of the ICC
statute on non-state parties in the context of this larger political
question regarding the relationship between US national security
strategy and international law. Much of the world is now quite
convinced that the United States aims to exempt itself entirely
from compliance with the rules of international humanitarian
law. The U.S. need not accede to the ICC Statute if it does not
believe it is in U.S. interests to do so. Still, it is unnecessary for
the United States to complain that the establishment of the ICC
unfairly impinges on U.S. sovereignty. The U.S. may not like the
existence of the court, but it has no legal right to prevent other
states from establishing it and attempting to develop the ICC
into an effective institution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Others have argued that the debate between the United
States and supporters of the ICC about the effect of the Court’s
statute is, in effect, a conflict between two differently valued
positions:
preserving
traditional
sovereignty
rules
of
international law versus ensuring an end to impunity for the

98 See, e.g., Letter from John Negroponte, the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations to the President of the United Nations
Security Council (Oct.7, 2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm.
99 See, e.g., William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365
(2004); Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2002).
100 Curtis F.J. Doebbler & Maha W. Eid, American International Lawyers and the Use
of Force, 16 PEACE REVIEW 279, 284 (2004).
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perpetrators of severe international crimes.101
However, I would argue that the Rome Statute was actually
careful to balance these values. As we have seen, it is true that
the existence of the Court potentially impacts the citizens of nonstate parties. However, it does so in a way that does not
substantially change their legal rights. As a practical matter
however, it increases the likelihood of prosecution because it
establishes a court with considerable independence from outside
political forces. Because the ICC is a supranational institution, it
will not be subject to the same diplomatic pressures as the courts
of less-powerful states. This is the real source of the hostility
toward the ICC’s impact on non-state parties and it really is not
a legal complaint.
Rather, it is a political one.
The
establishment of the ICC may very well lessen the capacity of
powerful states to use extra-legal political pressure to block the
prosecution of persons accused of ICC crimes when they see such
prosecutions as contrary to their national interests. This is an
objection to the ICC’s political impact on (some) sovereign states
de facto autonomy. It is not a reasonable legal objection to the
ICC’s impact on transforming the legal concept of state
sovereignty.

101 See generally Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent With the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167
MIL. L. REV. 20, 27-28 (2001) (describing the views of the proponents of the International
Criminal Court that state sovereignty should be subordinated to the greater good of the
world community). But see Scheffer, supra note 85 (describing the United State’s position
that the ICC interferes with state sovereignty).

